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extreme-right variants for two main reasons. Firstly, theories did not 
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This article aims to explain the variation in the electoral support for extreme-right parties in 
Europe. The extant literature on the far-right party family does not answer this question 
specifically with regard to the extreme-right variants for two main reasons. Firstly, theories did 
not expect the electoral success of these parties in post-war Europe due to their anti-democratic 
profiles and association with fascism. Secondly, despite the fact that they acknowledge the 
differences between the parties under the far-right umbrella – namely, the extreme and the 
radical – they normally do not take these differences into account, and if so, they focus on the 
radical right parties. This paper shows that electoral support for extreme-right parties is 
associated with low quality of government and highly conservative mainstream-right parties. 
The former creates political legitimisation for anti-democratic parties and the latter ideological 
normalisation of extreme-right.
Keywords: extreme-right, quality of government, party competition, mainstream- right
1. Introduction
Electoral support for far-right parties (FRPs) in Europe has attracted substantial scholarly 
attention, especially since the so-called ‘third-wave’ of 1980s (Kitschelt, 2007; Mudde, 2013).  
The far-right family is considered one of the most successful party families in recent Europe, 
though the parties included in this grouping display considerable ideological heterogeneity 
(Mudde, 2007; Ennser, 2012; Golder, 2016; Carter, 2018).  Specifically, scholars distinguish 
radical from extreme-right parties (ERPs), based on parties’ relationships with liberal 
democracy, fascism and violence (Mudde, 2007; Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 2015; 
Golder, 2016).  Despite acknowledging the ideological differences of parties under the far-right 
umbrella, the literature does not take these differences into account in empirical analyses, with 
few exceptions (Ignazi, 1992; Golder, 2003; Ignazi, 2003; Ford and Goodwin, 2010; Goodwin, 
2011).  When such ideological differences are considered, the literature is biased toward 
explanations of electoral support for European radical-right parties (RRPs).  This is 
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understandable as the radical variants are more successful, especially in Western Europe, 
compared to the extreme right; at the theoretical level, no theory has expected ERPs to achieve 
electoral success in post-war Europe, due to their anti-democratic and anti-systemic stance1 
(Betz, 1994; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995).  In recent years, and especially after the severe 
economic crisis that engulfed the European Union (EU) after 2008, electorally successful ERPs 
emerged in several European countries, including in Greece (Golden Dawn (GD)), Slovakia 
(People’s Party Our Slovakia) or Hungary (Jobbik)2.  Golder (2003) found that the electoral 
success of ERPs (‘neofascist’ for Golder) cannot be explained from the various mainstream 
theories, such as economic (unemployment) or cultural (immigration) competition, that explain 
the electoral support for radicals.  Complicating matters, countries such as Spain, Italy, 
Portugal and Ireland suffered from economic crises and mass immigration similar to those 
expected to explain ERPs’ successes; however, the failure of ERPs in these countries 
undermines such explanatory factors.  In short, the cross-national variation of electoral support 
for ERPs in Europe remains unexplained, and more importantly, conventional theories of far-
right support does not seem to explain this variation, so we need to look beyond them (see 
Golder, 2003).  This paper aims to address that gap.  While there are a few scholars who focused 
on the extreme variants of the far-right such as Ignazi (1992; 2003), Ford and Goodwin (2010), 
Goodwin (2011) or Golder (2003), their studies do not explain cross-national variation in the 
electoral support for ERPs in Europe.  According to the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
research which aims to systematically explain cross-national variation in ERPs’ (and not 
RRPs’) electoral success.
Considered unelectable due to their anti-democratic stance, ERPs require favourable demand 
and supply to be electorally successful.  This paper understands ERP’s success partly as a 
‘normal pathology’ (Mudde, 2010).  ‘Normal pathology’ thesis suggests that ERPs require non-
normality in order to be electorally attractive, due to the fact that their ideology is alien to 
European values (Mudde, 2010).  As Mudde (2010) showed, this is in fact not true for radical 
right parties, but the anti-democratic stance of ERPs requires a different approach.  As 
mainstream theories and explanatory factors do not explain variation in the electoral support 
for ERPs, we need to look beyond them.  This paper argues that, to increase the likelihood of 
1 For more details about the definitions and classification of the parties see section 2.
2 Jobbik was an anti-democratic extreme-right party until 2015, and was characterised as one of the few comparable parties to 
Golden Dawn.  It is important to note here that Jobbik from 2015 onwards moved towards the centre and cannot be considered 
as extreme-right.  However, for the timeframe of the analysis of this paper (2004-2015), Jobbik was an extreme-right party, 
and is classified as one of them.
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being electorally successful, ERPs require a form of non-normality, which would politically 
normalise their anti-democratic stance.  Building on the existing literature on the effects of the 
quality of government on support for democracy, and in extension on voting for anti-system 
parties (Agerberg, 2017; Boräng et al., 2017), this paper expects that poor quality of 
government (QoG), is a form of non-normality that politically normalises anti-system parties, 
and ERPs are anti-system by definition.  However, a ‘normal pathology’ approach is not 
enough to explain cross-national variation in the electoral support for ERPs, as not every 
country with poor QoG saw an increase in ERP vote share3, and also, as Agerberg (2017) 
showed, QoG explains voting for populist parties (left and right), as well. This paper assumes 
that demand-side needs to meet favourable supply-side for ERPs to be electorally successful.  
This paper argues that ideological normalisation of ERPs is the missing step.  The effect of 
mainstream right parties’ (MRPs) ideological positions on the electoral success of far-right 
parties is debated in the existing literature (Eatwell, 2000; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006).  There 
are two conflicting hypotheses; first, the more centrist the MRPs, the more successful the ERPs, 
due to limited competition; second, the more conservative the MRPs, the more successful the 
ERPs, as the latter’s ideological positions are legitimised by their proximity to mainstream 
figures.  Both expectations are plausible, and the existing literature is inconclusive.  We argue 
that those conditions interact: QoG is a moderating factor for the relationship between the 
ideological positions of MRPs and the electoral support for ERPs in Europe.  In countries with 
poor QoG, the more conservative the MRPs, the more successful the ERPs, as this creates 
political legitimacy and ideological normalisation for the latter.  However, the effect of MRPs’ 
positions on the electoral support for ERPs has the opposite (or no) effect when QoG improves. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the classification of the extreme 
right parties. Next, we present the main hypothesis of the paper in the context of the existing 
literature on the topic. The following sections discuss the statistical model and the data, present 
the results from the statistical analysis, and discuss the implications of the findings.
3 South and Eastern European countries tend to have poor quality of government, especially compared to Western European 
and Scandinavian countries, however, only in few countries are extreme-right parties electorally successful.  See Figure A1 in 
Appendix A. 
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2. Classifying Extreme Right Parties
Existing literature broadly defines the features that a party should meet in order to be 
considered as far-right (Mudde, 2007; Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 2015).  However, this 
party family is one of the most diverse in European party politics (Ennser, 2012; Halikiopoulou 
and Vlandas, 2016).  The broad definition of the FRP family, emphasises nativism, populism, 
authoritarianism (Mudde, 2007), and typically includes parties like GD from Greece or Jobbik 
from Hungary.  However, such parties resemble the traditional ER position of hostility toward 
liberal democracy and willingness to countenance violence against their internal or external 
enemies in order to impose their ideology.  On the other hand, the category includes parties 
like FPÖ from Austria and True Finns from Finland, which are ideologically more moderate.  
The diversity raises questions of the comparability of the involved parties.
This paper seeks to account for this problem of party comparability.  It suggests, based on 
Mudde’s (2007; 2019) and Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou’s (2015) definition, that under the 
far-right umbrella category, there are two, distinct, sub-party-families: the extreme-right and 
the radical-right, that are different in kind, not only in their extremeness (Golder, 2016).  The 
main differences between these two sub-party families are the hostility to liberal democracy, 
the acceptance of violence as a political means (either physical or verbal) (Mondon and Winter, 
2020)4, and the relation to fascism.  In this paper, we focus on explaining the electoral success 
of parties from the extreme right only5.  This is theoretically and empirically crucial, as no 
theory has expected the electoral success of ERPs, and also, as there is no research which 






4 Even if parties themselves officially reject that violent practices come from their official party, these acts could come from 
their youth groups or supporters. The parties do not distance themselves from these acts.
5 For parties’ identification and sources see Appendix A, Table A1.
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Hostile to Liberal Democracy Not totally hostile to Liberal Democracy
Tolerance to the use of violence Total rejection of violent acts
Tolerance to Fascism Total rejection of Fascism
3. Theorising the political and ideological normalisation of the 
extreme right
ERPs, as predicted by various theories (see Betz, 1994; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995), are 
usually unelectable in post-war Europe due to their anti-system/ anti-democratic stance.  To be 
electorally attractive, they need a form of non-normality, as ‘normal pathology’ thesis suggests 
(Mudde, 2010).  Many studies argue that this non-normality exists in periods of crisis, such as 
economic or immigration crises (Arzheimer, 2009; Mudde, 2010).  However, this is empirically 
falsified as ERPs were not electorally successful in countries which faced either economic or 
immigration crises, such as Portugal, Ireland or Italy, but also from Golder’s (2003) findings.  
This paper therefore, looks beyond the conventional theories, and argues that for ERPs to be 
electorally successful, they require conditions which create demand for anti-democratic parties 
(political normalisation of ERPs) and also favourable supply-side conditions through party 
competition (ideological normalisation).
QoG and ERPs political normalisation
QoG and quality of institutions are two factors that create demand for anti-democratic parties 
(Rothstein, 2009; Magalhaes, 2014; Boräng et al., 2017).  As a concept, QoG has attracted 
recent attention from political economy scholars (Mauro, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1997; 
Evans and Rauch, 1999; Hall and Jones, 1999; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Rodrik et al., 2004), 
with ongoing debate over how to define this term (Teorell and Rothstein, 2008; Holmberg et 
al., 2009).  For Teorell and Rothstein (2008) and Rothstein (2009), QoG should not violate the 
principle of impartiality; corruption and clientelism are the opposite of the term.  Though 
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plausible, there are theoretical problems with this definition.  First, there could be poor QoG 
without corrupt politicians, as politicians can be impartial but also produce bad governance.  
Second, assuming that corruption automatically violates the principle of impartiality is 
problematic because if corrupt politicians are equally corrupt with every citizen, then they are 
not partial (Sparling, 2018).  Instead, we adopt the World Bank’s influential definition of 
governance as ‘the traditions and institutions by which authority is exercised.  This includes 
(1) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced, (2) the capacity of 
the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and (3) the respect of 
citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among 
them’ (Kaufmann et al., 1999, p.1). 
Studies associate QoG with support for the existing regime (Dahlberg and Holmberg, 2014; 
Boräng et al., 2017).  Starting with the relationship between QoG and support for democracy, 
the former varies across different states, so scholars suggest that it should be treated as an 
independent driver for support for the regime (Bäck and Hadenius, 2008; Charron and 
Lapuente, 2010; Fukuyama, 2013).  Moreover, Rothstein (2009) challenges the idea that 
electoral democracy is the key for political legitimacy and argues that the latter largely depends 
on QoG.  The theoretical expectation that QoG is key for the legitimacy of the regime and 
support for democracy has also been confirmed by Dahlberg and Holmberg (2014).  It is 
expected, therefore, from the existing literature that QoG, and more specifically poor QoG, 
creates a support for anti-democratic forces within states, as it reduces the political legitimacy 
of the regime, and thereby reduces support for democracy.  In other words, it serves to 
legitimise the political existence of anti-democratic parties.
On the other hand, one might argue that it is plausible to assume that individuals in countries 
with poor QoG, instead of an alternative regime type and support for anti-democracy, or 
different forms of representation, might want to enhance their democratic institutions and 
practices.  This is indeed a plausible alternative way in which QoG might affect voting 
behaviour.  However, and despite the alternative explanation that in countries with poor QoG 
individuals might want to enhance the democratic institutions and practices in their country, 
there are good theoretical and empirical reasons to argue that poor QoG politically normalises 
anti-democratic or anti-system parties due to the decline in diffuse support for democracy.  This 
can be explained by various causal mechanisms that relate poor QoG with support for 
democracy, party system collapse and social contract. Starting with support for democracy, we 
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look at the two different types of regime support; ‘specific’ support, which focuses on “outputs 
and performance of the political authorities” (Easton, 1975, p. 437), and ‘diffuse’ support 
which is “evaluations of what an object is or represents – to the general meaning it has for a 
person – not of what it does” (Easton 1975: 444).  Several studies have shown that there is no, 
or weak, relationship between QoG and ‘specific’ support for a regime, but there is a strong 
relationship between QoG and ‘diffuse’ support for democracy (see Magalhaes, 2014; Boräng 
et al., 2017).  This is in line with Lipset’s (1959), Linz’s (1978), and Dahl’s (1971) reasoning 
who argue that government effectiveness, or governability, and the regime’s ability to offer 
successful solutions to basic societal problems, affects the stability of the regime, and the 
latter’s legitimacy.  
Moreover, scholars who have investigated democratic representation or party system collapse 
in regions such as Latin America, have theorised and supported with empirical findings that 
when QoG is poor, then it is not only the legitimacy of party systems that is affected 
(mainstream parties lose their legitimacy, party systems collapse, and new parties, including 
anti-system, are more likely to be electorally attractive), but also the legitimacy of the system 
itself (see Mainwaring et al., 2006; Seawright, 2012; Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou, 2018).  
More specifically, in countries with poor QoG/ governability, state capacity to meet its social 
contract obligations and provide the basic needs to their citizens is, or is perceived as, limited. 
This weakens democratic institutions and leads to party system collapse but also delegitimises 
the system of governance and democracy. This is therefore linked with the earlier discussion 
about the relationship between QoG and diffuse support for democracy, or the legitimacy of 
the regime.
So, despite that it is plausible to assume that voters, or a significant proportion of them, in 
countries with poor QoG, or where governments are inefficient, might want to strengthen 
democratic institutions and practices, and thus support democratic political parties, it is equally 
plausible to assume that individuals in these countries will develop negative attitudes towards 
democracy (the ideals of it) based on the outputs that regimes produce.  Empirical findings of 
studies which have systematically tested the causal mechanisms discussed above, show that 
poor QoG has a negative relationship with support for democracy and a positive relationship 
with support for anti-democratic or anti-system parties.  
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Linking the previous discussion with the electoral support for ERPs, the latter have tended to 
gain support because of the anti-democratic attitudes in newly democratised European states 
(Bustikova, 2009; Just, 2017).  There are some scholars, however, who have tried to link QoG 
with the electoral support for ERPs in Europe through different causal mechanisms.  
Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou (2018) suggest that, in times of economic crisis, poor QoG 
will lead to a decline of trust in democratic institutions, so, ERPs are more likely to succeed.  
They confirmed this suggestion by carrying out a controlled comparison of three South 
European states, namely Greece, Portugal and Spain; all suffered from the economic crisis but 
electoral support for ERPs in these countries varied, and only in Greece, where QoG is poor 
compared to the rest, ERP (GD) was successful.  Bustikova (2009) hypothesised that QoG in 
Eastern European countries is associated with higher support for ERPs.  She suggested that 
poor QoG leads to less satisfaction with democracy, and those individuals who are dissatisfied 
with democracy are more likely to vote for ERPs.  Agerberg (2017) associates low QoG with 
higher support for populist parties through the mechanism of ‘failed expectations’ from 
democratic systems and the anti-elite supply of populist parties.  So, various studies link QoG 
with support for democracy, and with support for anti-system parties due to their ideology and 
supply for alternative forms of representation, or even regime type.  However, the relationship 
between the QoG and ERP support deserves further investigation.  Firstly, those studies which 
link QoG with far-right support are regional specific (Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou (2018) 
focus on South Europe, and Bustikova (2009) on Eastern Europe).  Secondly, Agerberg (2017) 
showed that low QoG is associated with higher support for both left- and right-wing populist 
parties.  So, from the findings of the studies above, it is fairly safe to assume that low QoG is 
associated with ERP support, however, it is unclear under what conditions low QoG leads to 
higher ERP support, as not in every country with poor QoG, are ERPs successful. 
The importance of party competition and ideological normalisation of the ERPs
As briefly discussed earlier, in countries with low QoG, such as in Greece, the most successful 
challenger/ anti-system parties following the eruption of the crisis (2008-2009) were the left-
wing SYRIZA and GD, an ERP.  On the other hand, in Spain only Podemos, on the left, was 
electorally successful, and also in Portugal, only far-left parties increased their vote share, 
while a significant part of the population abstained (Pinto and Raimundo, 2014).  So, ERPs 
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find political opportunities due to poor QoG in some countries but not in others.  There is a 
need, therefore, to look not only on demand-side factors, but also to discuss supply-side factors 
that potentially create political opportunities for ERPs as well, and make the latter electorally 
attractive.  We expect that ideological normalisation of ERPs is the factor, accompanied by 
low QoG, that creates fertile grounds for ERPs.  Mainstream party positions have attracted 
substantial attention as a potential explanatory factor for the emergence of far-right parties and 
niche parties (Meguid, 2005; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Pardos-Prado et al., 2014; Pardos-
Prado, 2015; Gidron and Ziblatt, 2019).  Indeed, the logic of strategic voting suggests that far-
right parties’ electoral success  is conditional on MRPs’ positions (e.g. Arzheimer and Carter, 
2006).  If MRPs adopt positions close to the far right on issues that are important for the latter, 
then why should individuals vote for smaller parties? 
To operationalise the above, some studies expect that, when MRPs distance themselves from 
the far-right, then FRPs (extremes included) are more likely to succeed, mainly because they 
will find political opportunities in the absence of a mainstream competitor (Eatwell, 2000; 
Arzheimer and Carter, 2006).  This expectation is plausible in a sense that when MRPs are 
liberal, they may adopt positions on immigration, multiculturalism, religion or gay and 
minority rights, that are further away from those of far-right parties, creating space in the 
political system for parties with tougher stances on the above issues (Arzheimer and Carter, 
2006).  Far-right parties, by definition, are anti-immigration, nationalists, authoritarian, 
xenophobic, so if no other party represents these ideas, then they are more likely to be 
electorally successful (Eatwell, 2000).  This discussion led MRPs to adopt positions closer to 
the far-right in order to weaken the latter’s electoral support (Pardos-Prado et al., 2014; Pardos-
Prado, 2015). 
At the same time though, as Arzheimer and Carter (2006), Eatwell (2000) and Down and Han 
(2020) correctly identify, a very conservative MRP can have the exact opposite result, 
compared to the above, with regards to the electoral success of far-right parties as well.  This 
second theoretical expectation suggests that when MRPs converge with the far-right, the latter 
are more likely to be successful (Eatwell, 2000; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Pirro, 2014).  The 
basic idea behind this expectation is that a very conservative MRP normalises the ideological 
positions of far-right parties, due to the fact that more voters are exposed to these positions 
(Eatwell, 2000; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Arzheimer, 2009).  So, far-right parties would not 
be considered, ideologically, as alien or outsiders of the party competition.  Down and Han 
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(2020) tested the same theory on the electoral success for radical-right parties in Europe.  They 
found that when mainstream parties adopt positions close to the radical-right this increases the 
likelihood of voting for the latter, through far-right parties’ normalisation.  Lastly, Bale (2018) 
found that the British Conservative Party’s ideological repositioning closer to anti-EU and 
populist ideas created fertile grounds for UKIP.
Both theoretical expectations, therefore, are plausible.  On the one hand, far-right parties can 
find breeding grounds for success if mainstream-right parties are very liberal, as there is no 
competition.  On the other hand, they can find fertile grounds if their ideology is legitimised 
through the conservativeness of the mainstream right.  Both hypotheses have support in the 
existing literature (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Arzheimer, 2009; Dahlström and Sundell, 
2012; Dahlström and Esaiasson, 2013; Bale, 2018) and are plausible.
Political and ideological normalisation of ERPs
In a nutshell, this paper argues that for ERPs to be electorally attractive, both demand and 
supply sides should create fertile grounds for them. Specifically, political and ideological 
normalisation should interact to explain variation in the electoral support for ERPs.  The logic 
behind this argument is that there are two different types of support for democracy: one is the 
support for the ideal type of democracy and the second is the support based on what democracy 
offers to its citizens (Easton, 1975).  QoG measures what democracy offers and how it works.  
If we then accept the premise that QoG is a proxy for what regimes (in this case democracies) 
offer to their citizens, then it is a good indicator about satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the 
democratic system more broadly6.  So, poor QoG increases dissatisfaction towards democracy, 
which in turn creates fertile grounds for anti-system parties.  This paper assumes that as ERPs 
are by definition anti-system, due to their anti-democratic stance, poor QoG creates fertile 
grounds for ERPs.  Political normalisation is necessary for an ERP’s electoral support, but is, 
however, not sufficient. Poor QoG may lead to the electoral success of anti-systemic and/or 
6 See Appendix A, Figure A2 and Table A3, for the scatter plot and the correlation between QoG and Satisfaction with 
Democracy.
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populist parties from the left or from the right-wing (see Agerberg, 2017), so ERPs’ electoral 
success is underdetermined7.
We argue that ideological normalisation of ERPs is required as well.  MRPs as key ERPs’ 
competitors, can either close, or create political opportunities for ERPs.  Studies have shown 
that when MRPs adopt positions close to ERPs, then the latter cannot find space in party 
competition and therefore cannot be electorally successful (see Eatwell, 2000).  Other studies 
though suggest the opposite; when MRPs adopt positions close to ERPs, then the latter 
becomes ideologically normalised and eventually electorally successful.  The existing literature 
on party competition does not specify the conditions under which one of the two hypotheses 
above will prevail.  We expect the crucial condition to concern the political normalisation of 
the ERPs through low QoG.  As such, in those countries with poor QoG, the more conservative 
the MRPs on social or cultural issues, the more successful the ERPs. At the same time, in those 
countries with good QoG, highly conservative positions of MRPs are associated with either 
reduction in the electoral support for ERPs, or will be insignificant. The logic is that in 
countries with poor QoG and a highly conservative MRP, ERPs can find both the demand for 
anti-democracy, due to poor QoG, and the supply through their ideological normalisation, due 
to the positions of MRPs.  We therefore expect that:




This paper investigates cross-national variation in electoral support for ERPs in national 
elections from 2004-2015 in every EU member-state.  Many previous studies exclude countries 
where FRPs were absent (Knigge, 1998; Givens, 2005).  However, this creates selection bias 
7 See Appendix A, Figure A1 for the descriptive bar chart which plots the average QoG and the average ERP’s vote share by 
country from 2004-2015.
Page 11 of 81
Cambridge University Press
European Political Science Review
For Peer Review
12
(Arzheimer, 2009). In order to solve this issue, and as a result of the classification of the ERPs 
used in this article, all the 28 European Union members are included, following Golder’s 
(2003) and Jackman and Volpert’s (1996) assumptions that, even if ERP parties do not exist, 
we can assume that the demand for these parties exist; there are ER movements almost 
everywhere in Europe, even in countries without formal ERPs (Caiani et al., 2012), 
demonstrating the demand for these parties. In countries where ERPs are absent, the vote share 
has been coded as zero (0).
This paper concentrates on national elections, despite  European Parliamentary (EP) elections 
providing some very useful controls, such as the electoral systems or the time of the elections 
(Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, 2016). However, because EP elections are second-order elections 
(Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Hix and Marsh, 2007), the electoral support for ERPs might be over-
represented. Voters are more likely to express their dissatisfaction by supporting smaller 
parties.
Measuring QoG
We use data from the Worldwide Governance Indicators from the World Bank (Kaufmann et 
al. 1999)8 to measure QoG, which other studies have used to test the effects of QoG on far-
right support (e.g. Bustikova, 2009; Halikiopoulou & Vasilopoulou, 2018).  Others have used 
data from the Quality of Government Institute, and more specifically, from the European 
Quality of Government Index dataset (i.e. Agerberg, 2017), however this dataset has some 
limitations.  First, the proxy for the QoG is perceptions based, and second this dataset includes 
only three year points, 2010, 2013 and 2017. Governance for the World Bank is defined as ‘the 
traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised.  This includes the 
process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the 
government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens 
and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them’ 
(Kaufmann et al. 2010, p. 4).  By using this definition, the World Bank created six different 
variables to capture the three different aspects of the definition9.  In order to capture and 
measure the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced, they created 
8 The data gathered from the Quality of Government Institute Standard Dataset (Teorell et al., 2017, 2019).
9 For more details about the creation of these variables see (Kaufmann et al., 2009).
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two variables, namely voice and accountability, and political stability.  To capture the capacity 
of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, they created another 
two different variables, government effectiveness and regulatory quality.  Last but not least, to 
capture the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social 
interactions among them, the variables they created are control for corruption and rule of law.  
All these variables are scales which range from -2.5, which indicates the lowest QoG, to 2.5, 
which indicates the highest QoG (Kaufmann et al. 2010, p.12)10.
To measure QoG as a whole and to address multicollinearity11, we created a new variable, 
which is the average of all the six variables from the World Bank (a=0.96)12.  Studies associate 
QoG with corruption, so as robustness checks we use the Bayesian Corruption Indicator 
(Standaert, 2015), which is a scale from 0-100, and higher values indicate less corruption, as 
well as the political corruption index from Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) (Coppedge et al., 
2020; Pemstein et al., 2020), where higher values indicate more corruption.  Last, as this study 
argues that low QoG creates fertile grounds for ERPs through low satisfaction with democracy, 
we test the direct effect of the latter by using a satisfaction with democracy index (Klassen, 
2018), which is a range from 0-100 where 0 indicates the lowest satisfaction with democracy 
and 100 the highest.
Measuring mainstream right parties’ positions
The second important explanatory factor for the argument of this paper is the positions of the 
MRPs.  In order to measure this, we collected data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) 
trend file from 1999-2014 (Bakker et al., 2015). Despite the shortcomings when using CHES 
to explain electoral outcomes (e.g. the data do not line up with elections), as this paper is 
primarily interested in parties’ positions, rather than saliency, CHES data is still the best 
available source.  As the time frame of this research is from 2004 to 2015, we rely on three (3) 
different years of the data collection, 2006, 2010 and 201413. To measure the ideology of the 
10 For more information on the construction of the variables see Kaufmann et al. (2010) accessed at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1682130
11 For the correlation matrix see Appendix A, Table A9.
12 For Cronbach’s Alpha test table see Appendix A, Table A11.
13 For the list of MRPs see Appendix A, Table A17. It is important to note here that the MRPs are selected based on their 
electoral support, even if they are borderline cases of being far-right, such as Fidesz (Hungary) and PiS (Poland). It is important 
to note here that in some cases (20 elections) MRPs positions data from Chapel Hill are subsequent to the election years. This 
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mainstream right parties, we created two variables that capture the parties’ positions on social 
issues and immigration, multiculturalism and ethnic minorities, respectively.  Firstly, we sum 
the values of the variables that the Chapel Hill Expert Survey includes in order to capture the 
parties’ positions, namely the authoritarian-libertarian position, the positions on law and order, 
social lifestyle (which includes the positions on issues such as gay rights), religious principle, 
immigration, multiculturalism, and ethnic minorities (alpha = 0.89)14.  All these variables are 
scales from 0-10. The higher the number the more conservative the party, with smaller numbers 
indicating more liberal positions15.  Moreover, we disaggregated this variable further and we 
created an alternative variable that captures the mainstream-right parties’ positions on 
immigration issues only.  This latter variable was created by combining the variables on 
immigration position, multiculturalism and position on ethnic minorities (alpha = 0.85)16.  We 
employ this variable to test the effect of mainstream-right ideological positions on the issues 
of immigration, multiculturalism and ethnic minorities—key for ERPs (Pirro, 2014).  We also 
use data from the Manifesto Project (Volkens, et al., 2019), as a robustness check.  We 
calculated MRPs positions on the national way of life (for more details about the calculation, 
see Appendix A, Table A2), as a robustness check for the CHES variable.  We also tested the 
effect of saliency of MRPs on issues far-right parties own, but also MRPs’ positions on the 
same issues.  We tested the effect of MRPs’ positive mentions on national ways of life, which 
captures issues such as nationalism, and support for established national ideas, and also we 
created a proxy which captures the saliency of MRPs on both multiculturalism (negative 
mentions) and national way of life (positive).
Control Variables
We also control for other factors that scholars connect to the electoral success of the right-wing 
extremist parties17. To control the effect of the economy on the electoral support for ERPs, we 
control for unemployment (%), real GDP growth, and also the effect of the economic crisis by 
is done as CHES started collecting data on immigration and new politics issues from 2006 onwards.  However, we followed 
CHES coding and used the data on each MRP’s position that is closest to the election year (see CHES trend-file codebook for 
more details).  To solve the potential issues with endogeneity, we used Manifesto Project data as a robustness check, which is 
collected from manifestos prior to elections. 
14 For Cronbach’s Alpha test table see Appendix A, Table A13. 
15 For the definitions and the measurement of all the variables see Appendix A, Table A2.
16 For Cronbach’s Alpha test table see Appendix A, Table A14.
17 All the independent variables (both key independent variables and control variables) are lagged by one year, or to the closest 
available data.
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introducing a dummy variable with values 1 for every election after 2009 and 0 for every 
election from 2004-2008. We also control for the effect of immigration related variables by 
controlling the asylum seekers as percentage of the population.  We also tested a series of 
supply-side variables by controlling for the electoral rules, effective number of parties on votes 
level, voting turnout, electoral threshold, and the extent to which MRPs were incumbent prior 
the elections.  Last, we controlled for the effect of potential historical contexts in different 
regions (e.g. authoritarian past) by creating three dummy variables; firstly, a dummy which 
takes the value of 1 when countries are from south and eastern Europe, and 0 otherwise, 
secondly, a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 when countries are postcommunist and 
0 otherwise, and lastly, a dummy which takes the value of 1 when countries are from south 
Europe and 0 otherwise18. 
Model
The dependent variable is the vote share of the ERPs in every European Union member-state 
national election from 2004-2015.  This timeframe allows us to test the effect of the economic 
crisis (2004-2008 pre-crisis and 2009-2015 crisis). The dependent variable is left-censored as 
it cannot be negative. Also, as this paper aims to overcome the issue of selection bias and 
include countries with no ERP, the data includes many zeros on the dependent variable. It is 
problematic to use ordinary least squared (OLS) regression analysis when the dependent 
variable is censored or includes many zeros because of violations of the linearity assumption. 
Secondly, despite the absence in some countries of ERPs, one cannot assume that no support 
for such parties exists (Golder, 2003; Coffé et al., 2007). However, the OLS regression cannot 
take into account latent support for the ERPs in countries where these parties are absent. 
Instead, following Golder’s (2003), Jackman and Volpert’s (1996) and Jesuit, et al’s (2009) 
suggestions, we utilise a type I Tobit model.  Tobit models, initially proposed by Tobin (1958), 
are mostly applied to data-censoring problems (Jesuit et al., 2009, p.284); however, as 
Wooldrige (2002) suggests, these models can be applied for corner solutions to data with many 
zeros in the dependent variable.  As the dependent variable of this research has many zeros 
18 For the description and the sources for all variables see Appendix A, Table A2 and for the summary statistics see Appendix 
A, Table A4.
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(see Figure A3, Appendix A, page 11), a Tobit model is the most appropriate statistical model 
as it utilizes the maximum-likelihood for left-censored variables (Golder, 2003).19 
Despite the many advantages of the Tobit model for corner solutions issues, this statistical 
model could face some potential issues.  To start with, the Tobit model assumes that there is 
no heteroskedasticy and non-normality in the distribution of the error term (Jesuit et al. 2009; 
Wooldridge, 2002).  As the data for this paper is panel or cross-national time series, we cannot 
use panel corrected standard errors20 (Golder, 2003).  However, the test for heteroskedasticity21 
shows that this exists and we should take this into account.  A way to do this is to run a fixed-
effect model by using country dummies in order to account for potential heterogeneities among 
the countries (see Golder, 2003; Swank and Betz, 2003).  Another way to account for the issue 
of autocorrelation is to transform the dependent variable using the inverse hyperbolic sine 
(IHS) function that approximates a logarithm, following Jesuit et al’s (2009: 286) suggestion22.  
After the transformation of the dependent variable using the above formalisation, the dependent 
variables show much less variance (See Table A8, Appendix A). Also, Tables A5 (test before 
transformation) and A6 (after transformation) in Appendix A show that after the transformation 
of the dependent variable, autocorrelation is not an issue. The formalisation of IHS is as 
follows:
𝑠𝑖𝑛―1𝑦 = 𝑙𝑛𝑙𝑛 (𝑦 + 1 + 𝑦2) ≈ 𝑙𝑛2 + 𝑙
Model Formalisation
After considering the solution that the Tobit model offers to this analysis, as well as potential 
issues and how we take them into account, we present the formal models used. The standard 
Tobit model’s equation when the data is left-censored at 0 is that:
𝑦 ∗𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖,  𝜀𝑖~𝑁(𝜎2,0)  𝑖 = 1,…,𝑛→𝑦 ∗𝑖 ~𝑁(𝑥𝑖𝛽,𝜎2)𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦 ∗𝑖  𝑖𝑓 𝑦 ∗𝑖 > 0
19 For more information on Tobit models see Amemiya (1984), Wooldridge (2002) and Greene (2000, 2001a, 2001b).
20 After xttobit command, STATA does not allow for robust command.
21 For Heteroskedasticity tests see Appendix A, Table A7.
22 Stata command for the transformation gen IHS = log(erp_vote + sqrt(erp_vote^2 + 1)).
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𝑦𝑖 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑦 ∗𝑖 ≤ 0
where is the latent dependent variable and  is the observed dependent variable (e.g. 𝑦 ∗𝑖  𝑦𝑖
Amemiya, 1984; Golder, 2003; Jesuit et al., 2009; Wooldridge, 2002). Additionally,  is the 𝑥𝑖
vector for the independent variables and β is the vector for the coefficients. We present the 
coefficients, which are the marginal effects on the latent dependent variable  for the issues 𝑦 ∗𝑖
of comparability as all the studies which utilised tobit models presented these coefficients 
(Golder, 2003; Jackman and Volpert, 1996; Jesuit et al., 2009; Swank and Betz, 2003)23. For 
the purpose of this paper the standard Tobit model will be transformed as:
𝐷𝑉 ∗𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑄𝑜𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑠 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑄𝑜𝐺 ∗ 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑠 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡(%)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑙𝑢𝑚 𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 (%)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑛 ― 𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡𝐷𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐷𝑉 ∗𝑖,𝑡 𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑉 ∗𝑖,𝑡 > 0
0𝐷𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑉 ∗𝑖,𝑡 =
The two baseline models include as key independent variables the proxy for QoG, the two 
proxies for the ideology of mainstream right-wing parties24, their interaction terms, and the 
controls for unemployment, real GDP growth, asylum seekers, and electoral rules.  All the 
baseline models include country fixed effects (inclusion of country dummies) in order to 
account for heteroskedasticity25.  This could absorb cross-national variation, however, all the 
country dummies are statistically insignificant,26 showing that the models capture cross-
national variation well.  
5. Results
23 Results from tobit could be analyzed as a) the marginal effects of the independent variables on the observed outcome or b) 
on the uncensored observed outcome (Golder, 2003).
24 To control for multicollinearity and also tackle potential endogeneity issues, we have plotted a scatter plot of QoG against 
MRPs’ positions on immigration multiculturalism and ethnic minorities, and added a table with the correlation matrix between 
the two variables (See Appendix A, Table A18, Figure A7). Both show that the two variables are not correlated.
25 We have included OLS regression models with and without country fixed effects as robustness checks. See Appendix B, 
Table B1 and Figure B1 for results.
26 Despite the fact that country dummies show statistical insignificance, the log-likelihoods of the models with country 
dummies also show that they should be retained in the analysis.
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We ran a series of cross-sectional time-series Tobit regression models in national parliamentary 
elections from 2004 to 2015. For this time period, there were 90 observations-elections points 
for most regression models, given missing data. As the key argument of this paper includes an 
interaction term, and also due to the fact that interaction effects cannot be evaluated from tables 
(Brambor et al., 2006; Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, 2016), we plot the interaction terms; 
however, we have included the regression tables in Appendix A.
The upper left panel of Figure 1 plots the average marginal effects of the MRPs’ positions on 
immigration, multiculturalism and ethnic minorities on ERPs’ support conditional on the two 
key independent variables on QoG, after the baseline model27. It shows that in countries where 
QoG is 0.8 or below, the more conservative the MRPs, the more successful the ERPs. However, 
when QoG increases the effect of MRPs’ positions becomes insignificant.  The upper right 
panel plots the average marginal effect of MRPs’ positions on social issues on ERPs’ support 
conditional on QoG. The results are similar to the left panel’s.  When QoG is 0.8 or below, 
when MRPs move towards the right on social issues, support for ERPs is increasing.  But when 
QoG is above 0.8, then the effect of MRPs’ positions on ERPs’ support loses its significance.  
The lower left panel plots the average marginal effect of MRPs’ positions on national way of 
life conditional on QoG.  The results are fairly similar with the two interaction terms with the 
key IVs from CHES data.  When QoG is poor (below 0.5), the more conservative the MRP, 
the more likely for ERPs to increase their vote share.
[Figure 1 about here]
These findings shed light to why the re-emergence of ERPs did happen in some countries with 
poor QoG such as Greece, Hungary and Slovakia, but not in others such as Portugal, and is 
explained by the MRPs’ positions and the extent to which ERPs are ideologically normalised.  
Also, in countries with good QoG, such as Western European or Scandinavia, ERPs will remain 
electorally as they are not politically legitimised. 
Robustness Checks
27 For the regression table see Appendix A, Table A15
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We have run a series of robustness checks in order to test the sensitivity of the results. We 
started by testing the baseline model with the transformed DV, and the two CHES variables as 
key IVs for MRPs’ positions, but with Front National coded not as an ERP28.  We ran the same 
models with key independent variables, the MRPs positions on immigration, multiculturalism 
and ethnic minorities and QoG by using firstly, a tobit model with the non-transformed 
dependent variable, and also, two OLS regression models one with and another without fixed 
effects29.  The results of the baseline models hold after these robustness checks30.
We also ran several tobit models starting by controlling for MRPs’ positions on immigration 
saliency to control for Meguid’s (2005) findings. Secondly, we added several control variables 
to control for the effect of supply-side factors. Thirdly, we excluded from the sample only 
Greece, only Hungary and then both countries31. Fourthly, we controlled for the effect of the 
2008 economic crisis. Fifthly, we added time dummies to control for potential time effects. 
Sixthly, we added three dummy variables to control for the effect of historical contexts in a) 
Postcommunist countries, b) South European countries, and c) Postcommunist and South 
European countries. Last, we controlled for the effect of RRPs’ vote shares. The results of the 
interaction terms hold even after these robustness checks32.
In the fourth step of robustness checks, we disaggregated the QoG variable, and added as key 
independent variables the six variables created from the World Bank, plus three own calculated 
variables that capture the three aspects of QoG as defined by the World Bank33.  The results 
hold even after the disaggregation of the QoG variable, especially for when QoG is poor34.
28 There are several reasons why we decided to rerun the baseline models with the exclusion of the Front National from our 
dependent variable, but without excluding France from the sample. The most important one is that according to the definition 
of ERPs of this paper, the FN can lie under the extreme-right umbrella under Jean-Marie Le Pen’s leadership, due to the 
relationship with fascism, or to put it correctly, holocaust denial and racism. However, the vast majority of scholars who work 
on the far-right classify FN, as radical-right, and also scholars such as Kitschelt and McGann (1995) used FN as their master 
case (as radical-right). So, to test the robustness of the findings of this study, and also to acknowledge the fact that FN under 
Jean-Marie Le Pen was a borderline case, we decided to consider this party as radical-right for the robustness check.  For the 
regression outputs and the interaction plots see Appendix B, Table B1 and Figure B1.
29 For the regression outputs and the interaction plots see Appendix B, Table B2 and Figure B2.
30 It is important to note here, that the results hold even after the OLS regression model with fixed effects, which shows that 
the key hypothesis of this study is confirmed, but also allows us to, at least partially, control for endogeneity and/or other 
potential issues such as omitted variable bias.
31 Greece and Hungary have the most successful extreme-right party (Golden Dawn and Jobbik) in the sample, poor quality 
of government and highly conservative mainstream right parties (New Democracy and Fidesz), which may be driving the 
results. As a robustness check, we decided to exclude these countries from the sample.  The results of the interaction terms 
hold after the exclusion of Hungary. When we exclude Greece and then Greece and Hungary, the results hold at 90%.
32 For regression tables and interaction plots see Appendix B, Table B3 and Figure B3.
33 For the definitions and the creation of the variables see Appendix A, Table A2.
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As a fifth step, instead of the QoG variable, we used three other key IVs, starting with 
satisfaction with democracy index, and we continued with the Bayesian corruption index, and 
political corruption index from V-DEM.  The results of the interaction terms show the same 
patterns even after we used different proxies for the QoG35.
For the last set of robustness checks, we run the baseline model for the years after 2006 to 
control for endogeneity. The CHES dataset collects data on positions on immigration and other 
new politics from 2006 onwards.  As mentioned earlier, we used the coding from the CHES 
trend-file to attach MRPs’ positions to each election year, however, sometimes the election 
year is prior to the data collection.  This might create some methodological issues 
(endogeneity).  To control for the validity of our statistical findings, we excluded all the 
election years prior to 2006.  Even after the exclusion of the elections prior to 2006, and with 
the total sample dropped to 70, the results hold36. 
For the last step of our analysis, we run two tobit models with two three-way interaction terms. 
We started by including the interaction term between QoG without political stability, MRPs’ 
positions on immigration, multiculturalism and ethnic minorities, and the extent to which the 
MRP competitor was incumbent or not.  Someone could say that ERPs will be electorally 
successful in countries with poor QoG and highly conservative MRP positions, only if MRPs 
were incumbent in the previous elections. This is plausible, however, the results from Figure 
A4 (Appendix A for the regression table see, Table A16, model 1) show that in countries with 
poor QoG, the more conservative the MRPs, the more successful the ERPs, independently of 
the incumbency status of MRPs. However, when MRPs were not incumbent, in countries with 
good QoG, the accommodation strategy harms ERPs, but when MRPs were incumbent, the 
effect of their positions in countries with QoG above 0.7 is statistically insignificant.
Secondly, we tested the interaction term between our key IVs with MRPs’ salience of national 
way of life, and issues that far-right parties, usually, own.  Figures A5 and A6 (Appendix A) 
show that when MRPs’ salience increases on national way of life, and/or on issues far-right 
parties own in countries with poor QoG, the more conservative the MRPs, the more successful 
34 For interaction plots see Figure B4 and for the regression table see Table B4 in Appendix B.
35 See Appendix B, Table B5 and Figure B5.
36 See Appendix B, Table B6, and Figure B6.
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the ERPs, which further confirms the ideological normalisation hypothesis.  It also shows that 
in countries with good QoG, when the salience increases, ERPs are less successful when MRPs 
adopt accommodative strategies.
6. Illustrative cases
The findings of the statistical analysis of this paper show that ERPs are more likely to increase 
their vote share when QoG is poor, which normalises ERPs’ political presence, and MRPs 
adopt highly conservative positions, especially on immigration, multiculturalism and ethnic 
minorities, through normalisation of ERPs’ ideology.  These findings explain why traditional 
ERPs tend to be electorally successful only in South or Eastern Europe, where QoG tends to 
be significantly worse than in Western Europe or Scandinavia.  Taking into consideration the 
limited number of observations (90) of the statistical analysis, and despite that the results hold 
a bevy of robustness checks, it is important to discuss some illustrative cases (successful and 
unsuccessful) to strengthen the plausibility of the argument of this paper.  This will also allow 
us to control for potential endogeneity or the alternative explanation that MRPs shift towards 
the right after ERP electoral support.  We will focus then at the two cases which mostly drive 
the statistical findings, Greece and Hungary, to show that the qualitative stories of these 
countries confirm the findings of our statistical analysis. 
Starting with Greece, the rise of GD shows how the political and ideological normalisation of 
ERPs works.  Greece is a country with poor QoG37.  There is a clear significant drop in QoG 
from 2005 onwards and this drop is even clearer after 2008.  As a result, the political 
normalisation of the FR in Greece exists since 2008.  However, ERPs remained completely 
electorally marginalised in national elections until 2012 or, as discussed above, until 2010, in 
mayoral elections in Athens, as GD received only 0.3% in the 2009 national elections.  After 
the 2009 national elections, when New Democracy lost to the Panhellenic Socialist Movement, 
the former changed leadership.  Under the then-new leadership of Antonis Samaras, New 
Democracy changed its positions.  The party became more conservative on social issues, and 
37 See Appendix B, Figure B7. 
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even more clearly so on issues such as immigration, multiculturalism and rights of ethnic 
minorities38.  Only after the transformation of New Democracy did GD manage to be 
electorally successful and enter the Greek parliament.
The same pattern can be found if we look at Hungary, and the rise of Jobbik.  Jobbik, became 
electorally successful in the 2010 national elections.  The party gained 16.67% of the total votes 
and became the third largest party in the Hungarian parliament, similar to GD in the 2015 Greek 
national election.  Fidesz, the MRP in Hungary, initially formed as a civic youth movement 
(1988) and transformed to a liberal party (in terms of economy and cultures) in 1990 (Pytlas, 
2016).  The transformation of the party to a highly conservative MRP started initially in 1994, 
with a party split when liberal members of the party left, and continued further from 1995 
onwards.  In 2001, Fidesz moved further towards the far-right (Bozóki 2008: 210)39.  Fidesz 
continued to be highly conservative, especially on social issues, which resulted in the 
normalisation of far-right ideas.  It is not surprising that individuals in Hungary show the 
highest anti-immigration sentiments across Europe (Messing and Ságvári, 2019).  Jobbik took 
advantage of the normalisation of FR ideas in Hungary, and as the QoG was declining from 
the mid-2000s onwards40, normalised politically the agenda of the ERP.  The normalisation of 
the far-right continued even after 2010, and the transformation of Fidesz to a far-right party, 
continues to normalise far-right ideas in Hungary.  Most crucially though, the transformation 
of Fidesz did not happen as a response to Jobbik’s electoral support, but started much earlier. 
The two illustrative cases show that in Greece and Hungary, ERPs were politically and 
ideologically normalised, and also that the transformation of the MRPs happened prior to the 
electoral success of ERPs in these countries.
7. Conclusion
This paper aimed to explain variation in the electoral support for ERPs in European Union 
member-states, contributing to the wider literature on far-right success.  Though scholars 
38 See Appendix B, Table B7.
39A prime example which shows the shift of Fidesz further to the right from 2001 is the Hungarian Status Law, adopted in 
2001. For more details about this please see (Pytlas, 2016; Chapter 2, ‘Hungary: Jobbik vs Fidesz’ section).
40 See Appendix B, Table B7.
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(Ignazi, 1992; Golder, 2003; Ignazi, 2003; Ford and Goodwin, 2010; Goodwin 2011) 
accounted for the differences of the parties under the far-right umbrella, their studies did not 
explain cross-national variation in the electoral support for ERPs.  This paper theorised and 
showed that political and ideological normalisation of the ER creates political opportunities for 
ERPs’ success.  
Building on studies on the relationship between QoG and voting behaviour, we expected that 
in countries with poor QoG, anti-system parties would find fertile grounds for electoral success 
through various mechanisms, such as dissatisfaction with democracy, or ‘failed expectations’ 
(Agerberg, 2017).  This article also expected that the positions of mainstream right parties can 
create or close the political space for ER competitors. The existing literature proposes two 
competing hypotheses; MRPs’ accommodation strategy, firstly, legitimise ERPs’ ideology, so 
the latter are more likely to succeed, and secondly, close the political space for ERPs, the latter 
therefore are electorally unsuccessful.  The findings regarding the effects of MRPs’ positions 
on ERPs’ support are conflicting.  After running several regression models, this paper shows 
that QoG moderates the effect of the MRPs’ positions, on the electoral support for ERPs.  More 
specifically, as hypothesised, ERPs are more likely to succeed in countries with poor QoG and 
a highly conservative MRP.  However, as the QoG improves, the effect of MRPs’ positions on 
ERPs’ support loses its significance, and is some cases even reduces ERPs’ support (mainly 
when QoG is extremely good).  We also show that MRPs’ salience on far-right issues mitigates 
the size of the effect of MRPs’ positions and QoG on ERPs’ success.  The last key finding of 
this paper shows that in countries with poor QoG, highly conservative MRPs are associated 
with higher support for ERPs, independently of the fact they were part of the government in 
the previous elections or not.  The findings of this paper are particularly important as they show 
that under specific conditions, party competition, and more specifically, the ideological 
positions of MRPs, could have different effects on voting for ERPs.  The findings of this study 
correspond closely to the existing literature about the effectiveness of political ostracism, as a 
strategy to combat anti-immigration parties’ support (see van Spanje and and Weber, 2019), as 
they show that contextual characteristics, in this case QoG, might explain cross-national 
variation in the electoral support for ostracised anti-immigration parties.
The contribution of this paper is therefore twofold. First, it is the first paper that focuses solely 
on explaining the variation in electoral support for ERPs across Europe. Second, by 
demonstrating the interaction with QoG, we reconcile two competing hypotheses in the 
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existing literature, which suggest that MRPs’ positions have conflicting effects on the electoral 
success of ERPs.  This paper showed that demand-side conditions, QoG in this case, moderate 
the effect of the ideological positions of the mainstream right.
By combining demand- and supply-side factors, this paper opens avenues for further research. 
More specifically, by showing that QoG moderates the effect of the positions of MRPs, this 
article creates fertile grounds for further research on how demand-side factors moderate or 
mitigate the effect of supply-side and vice versa. This paper derived macro-level hypotheses; 
however, the micro-level implications of these findings deserve attention.  Also, this paper 
found that party competition, in this case the relationship between the mainstream and the far-
right helps us to explain variation in the electoral support for the latter.  Despite that it is beyond 
the scope of this paper, it is equally important to test the effect of party competition across the 
left-right spectrum on ERP support.  Also, as this paper’s sample is rather small, with the 
availability of data on QoG and parties’ positions, scholars can test the hypothesis of this study 
by expanding the temporal coverage. Last, the same framework can be applied to other party 
families, such as the far right as whole or the far left.
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Table A1: Extreme right parties in Europe
Countries Extreme Right Parties Sources
Austria None
Belgium Front National (2007), 
Belgians Rise Up(check)
First: part of: http://aemn.info
Second: https://www.asiaone.com/world/belgium-
bans-anti-semitic-hatefest
Bulgaria Ataka (Bustikova, 2018)
Croatia None











France Front National (-2011) Under Jean-Marie Le Pen due to fascism
Germany National Democratic 
Party
(Minkenberg, 2013)
Greece Golden Daw (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 2015)
Hungary Jobbik (Minkenberg, 2013)
Ireland None
Italy Fiamma Tricolore, Forza 
Nuova, CasaPound
(Minkenberg, 2013)
Latvia All for Latvia (-2006) (Bustikova, 2009)





Portugal National Renovator Party (Marchi, 2013)
Romania Greater Romania Party (Minkenberg, 2013)
Slovakia Our Slovakia (Bustikova, 2018)
Slovenia Slovenian National Party (Bustikova, 2009)
Spain Espana 2000, National 
Democracy




British National Party (Minkenberg, 2013)
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Percentage of votes for extreme right parties in National parliamentary elections from 2004-2015 Various Sources: 























Row mean of the variables, control for corruption, rule of law, regulatory quality, government 






Control of Corruption - Estimate: ”Control of Corruption” measures perceptions of corruption, 
conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private gain. The particular aspect of 
corruption measured by the various sources differs somewhat, ranging from the frequency of 
”additional payments to get things done”, to the effects of corruption on the business environment, to 
measuring ”grand corruption” in the political arena or in the tendency of elite forms to engage in ”state 





(Kaufmann et al., 2010)
Rule of Law 
(RLE) Index (-
2.5 to 2.5)
Rule of Law - Estimate: ”Rule of Law” includes several indicators which measure the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the incidence 
of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. 
Together, these indicators measure the success of a society in developing an environment in which fair 
and predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions and the extent to which 
property rights are protected. Years used for each country: year prior to elections if applicable, 




(Kaufmann et al., 2010)
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”Government Effectiveness” combines into a single grouping
responses on the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence
of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of
the government’s commitment to policies. The main focus of this index is on ”inputs” required for




(Kaufmann et al., 2010)
Regulatory 
Quality
”Regulatory Quality” includes measures of the incidence of market unfriendly
policies such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the









”Political Stability” combines several indicators which measure perceptions
of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly




(Kaufmann et al., 2010)
Voice and 
Accountability
”Voice and Accountability” includes a number of indicators
measuring various aspects of the political process, civil liberties and political rights. These indicators
measure the extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of 
governments.
This category also includes indicators measuring the independence of the media, which serves




(Kaufmann et al., 2010)
Control For 
Corruption and 
Rule of Law 
Row Mean 
(CCE and RLE 
Row Mean)
Row mean of Control for Corruption and Rule of Law for each country. Own Calculation
Government 
Capacity
Row mean of the variables government effectiveness and regulatory quality Own Calculation
Government 
Selection




Measures the positions of mainstream right parties on issues related to immigration.
Row Total of the variables: immigration policy, multiculturalism and ethnic minorities.
Own calculation All variables 
gathered from Chapel Hill 
Expert Survey Trend File 
(Baker et al., 2015)
MRP Positions 
on Social Issues
Measures the position of mainstream right parties in EU-28 on social issues.
row mean of the variables: gal/tan, civil liberties/law and order, social lifestyle, religious principle, 
immigration policy, multiculturalism and ethnic minorities.
Own calculation. All variables 
gathered from Chapel Hill 
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Expert Survey Trend File 
(Baker et al., 2015)
MRPs 
Incumbent
Measures the extent to which mainstream-right parties were incumbent or not before the elections. Own Calculation
Electoral Rule 
House
Which electoral rule (proportional representation or plurality) governs the election of the majority of
House seats? This is coded 1 if most seats are Plurality, zero if most seats are Proportional. In cases
where the majority of legislators are appointed or indirectly elected, the variable is coded Indirect.
Database of Political Institutions 
2017 (Scartascini et al., 2018)
Asylum Seekers 
(%)
Refugee population by country or territory of asylum (World Development Indicators: 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators






Effective number of parties on the votes level according to the formula [N2] pro-posed by Laakso and 
Taagepera (1979). Years used for each country: year prior to elections
Armingeon, Wegner, 
Wiedemeier, Isler, Knoepfel, 
Weisstanner and Engler 
http://www.cpds-data.org/
(Armingeon et al., 2018)
Electoral 
Threshold
What is the vote threshold for representation? Records the minimum vote share that a party must
obtain in order to take at least one seat in PR systems. If there are more than one threshold, record the 
one that governs the most seats.
Database of Political Institutions 
2017 (Scartascini et al., 2018)
Voting Turnout Voting turnout in elections
Armingeon, Wegner, 
Wiedemeier, Isler, Knoepfel, 
Weisstanner and Engler 
http://www.cpds-data.org/
(Armingeon et al., 2018)
National way of 
life (MRPs 
positions)
National Way of Life: Positive – National Way of Life: Negative
National Way of Life: Positive
Favourable mentions of the manifesto country’s nation, history, and general appeals. May include:
• Support for established national ideas;
• General appeals to pride of citizenship;
• Appeals to patriotism;
• Appeals to nationalism;
• Suspension of some freedoms in order to protect the state against subversion.
National Way of Life: Negative
Unfavourable mentions of the manifesto country’s nation and history. May include:
Data gathered from Manifesto 
Project: https://manifesto-
project.wzb.eu/ 
Volkens, Andrea / Krause, 
Werner / Lehmann, Pola / 
Matthieß, Theres / Merz, 
Nicolas
/ Regel, Sven / Weßels, 
Bernhard(2019): The Manifesto 
Data Collection. Manifesto
Project (MRG / CMP / 
MARPOR). Version 2019b. 
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• Opposition to patriotism;
• Opposition to nationalism;
• Opposition to the existing national state, national pride, and national ideas.
Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum 
Berlin
für Sozialforschung (WZB). 
https://doi.org/10.25522/manifes
to.mpds.2019b
National way of 
life (positive)
National Way of Life: Positive
Favourable mentions of the manifesto country’s nation, history, and
general appeals. May include:
• Support for established national ideas;
• General appeals to pride of citizenship;
• Appeals to patriotism;
• Appeals to nationalism;
• Suspension of some freedoms in order to protect the state against
subversion.
For all documents that have been coded with version 5 of the Coding
Instructions
Data gathered from Manifesto 
Project: https://manifesto-
project.wzb.eu/ 
Volkens, Andrea / Krause, 
Werner / Lehmann, Pola / 
Matthieß, Theres / Merz, 
Nicolas
/ Regel, Sven / Weßels, 
Bernhard(2019): The Manifesto 
Data Collection. Manifesto
Project (MRG / CMP / 
MARPOR). Version 2019b. 
Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum 
Berlin




Measures mainstream right parties salience on national way of life and multiculturalism. The variable 
created from four variables gathered from Manifesto Project, and more specifically salience =  national 
way of life positive + multiculturalism negative 
Own Calculation.
Data gathered from Manifesto 
Project: https://manifesto-
project.wzb.eu/ 
Volkens, Andrea / Krause, 
Werner / Lehmann, Pola / 
Matthieß, Theres / Merz, 
Nicolas
/ Regel, Sven / Weßels, 
Bernhard(2019): The Manifesto 
Data Collection. Manifesto
Project (MRG / CMP / 
MARPOR). Version 2019b. 
Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum 
Berlin
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These index scores represent an average of all country-survey scores available within each country-
year observation. Overlapping country-survey are averaged to create unique country-year 
observations.
Scores range from 0 representing the lowest possible level of satisfaction to 100 representing the 
highest possible level.
Human Understanding 









Political corruption. Question: How pervasive is political corruption?
Clarification: The directionality of the V-Dem corruption index runs from less corrupt to more corrupt 
(unlike the other V-Dem variables that generally run from less democratic to more democratic 
situation). The corruption index includes measures of six distinct types of corruption that cover both 
different areas and levels of the polity realm, distinguishing between executive, legislative and judicial 
corruption. Within the executive realm, the measures also distinguish between corruption mostly 
pertaining to bribery and corruption due to embezzlement. Finally, they differentiate between 
corruption in the highest echelons of the executive (at the level of the rulers/cabinet) on the one hand, 
and in the public sector at large on the other. The measures thus tap into several distinguished 640 
types of corruption: both ’petty’ and ’grand’; both bribery and theft; both corruption aimed and 
influencing law making and that affecting implementation. Aggregation: The index is arrived at by 
taking the average of (a) public sector corruption index; (b) executive corruption index; (c) the 
indicator for legislative corruption; and (d) the indicator for judicial corruption. In other words, these 
four different government spheres are weighted equally in the resulting index. V-Dem replace missing 
values for countries with no legislature by only taking the average of (a), (b) and (d).
Varieties of Democracy (V-
Dem) Project: https://v-
dem.net/en/data/ 
(Coppedge et al., 2017) 




The BCI index values lie between 0 and 100, with an increase in the index corresponding to a raise in 
the level of corruption. This is a first difference with CPI and WGI where an increase means that the 
level of corruption has decreased.
There exists no objective scale on which to measure the perception of corruption and the exact scaling 
you use is to a large extent arbitrary. However, we were able to give the index an absolute scale: zero 
corresponds to a situation where all surveys say that there is absolutely no corruption. On the other 
hand, when the index is one, all surveys say that corruption is as bad as it gets according to their scale. 
This is another difference with CPI and WGI, where the scaling is relative. They are rescaled such that 
WGI has mean 0 and a standard deviation of 1 in each year, while CPI always lies between 0 and 100.
In contrast, the actual range of values of the BCI will change in each year, depending how close 
countries come to the situation where everyone agrees there is no corruption at all (0), or that corruption 
The Bayesian Corruption Index 
- 2018 update.
(Standaert, 2015)
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is as bad as it can get (100). By way of illustration, the figure below shows the histogram of the BCI 
in 2014. The country with the lowest level of corruption is New Zealand (15.4), while
corruption is most problematic in Somalia (70.9).
The absolute scale of the BCI index was obtained by rescaling all the individual survey data such that 
zero corresponds to the lowest possible level of corruption and 1 to the highest one. We subsequently 
rescaled the BCI index such that when all underlying indicators are zero (one), the expected value of 
the BCI index is zero (hundred).
Postcommunist 
dummy
1 if countries are postcommunist – 0 otherwise 
Postcommunist countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 




1 if countries are in South Europe – 0 otherwise 





1 if countries are either postcommunist or south European – 0 otherwise
Own calculation
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Figure A1:QoG and ERPs vote share across Europe
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Table A3: Correlation between Satisfaction with Democracy and Quality of Government
Satisfaction with Democracy Quality of Government
Satisfaction with Democracy 1.0000
Quality of Government 0.8394 1.0000
Figure A2: Relationship between Satisfaction with democracy and quality of government
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Table A4: Summary Statistics of all variables
Variable N Mean Standard 
Deviation
Min Max
ERPs vote share 90 1.531078 3.388663 0 20.22
Transformed DV 90 .6387486 .998135 0 3.70043
Quality of Government 90 1.01705 .5218111 -
.0464918
1.908547
Control for Corruption and Rule of Law 
Mean
90 1.011043 .7356749 -
.2624495
2.24216
Government Capacity 90 1.134887 .5249662 -
.1705045
2.066595
Government Selection 90 .9052201 .3637561 .232786 1.692318
Control for Corruption 90 .9539356 .8479524 -.303652 2.5
Government Effectiveness 90 1.104999 .62659 -.316024 2.3449
Political Stability and Absence of Violence 90 .6987221 .4250948 -.305335 1.51389
Rule of Law 90 1.06815 .6428085 -.227121 2.12056
Regulatory Quality 90 1.164774 .4548137 -.072293 1.90389
Voice and Accountability 90 1.111718 .3951302 .295875 2.5
MRPs Positions on Immigration, 
Multiculturalism and Ethnic Minorities 
90 19.6682 3.05145 9.749269 24.76786
MRPs Positions on Social Issues 90 44.6533 7.830914 27.23757 58.48
National way of life (position) 86 2.59436    2.631623 0 12.048
National way of life (positive) (salience) 87 2.54023 2.641089 0 12.05
Far-right issues (salience) 87 3.469425 3.625428 0 18.81
MRPs Incumbent 90 .4 .4926425 0 1
Unemployment (%) 90 9.648122 5.016642 3.3 26.47
Real GDP Growth 90 1.688778 4.120205 -14.35 11.09
Asylum Seekers (%) 90 .222311 .3452964 .00037 1.9754
Effective number of parties on votes level 90 4.90402 1.559035 2.05005 10.06918
Voting Turnout 90 68.24667 13.497 39.2 93.3
Electoral Rule House 90 .1 .3016807 0 1
Electoral Threshold 84 3.942143 4.223053 0 25
Satisfaction with Democracy Index 88 49.59342 13.54137 20.84309 80.09397
Political Corruption Index 88 .1988179 .1858928 .0059285 .7857288
Bayesian Corruption Index 90 38.11589 12.84644 14.5244 56.383
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Figure A3: ERP's Vote Share (2004-2015)
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Table A5: Test for Autocorrelation before the transformation of the DV
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
H0: no first order autocorrelation
F(  1,      22) =     34.703
Prob > F =      0.0000
Table A6:Test for Autocorrelation after the transformation of the DV
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
H0: no first order autocorrelation
F(  1,      22) =      0.724
Prob > F =      0.4041
Table A7: Test for heteroskedasticity
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Ho: Constant variance
Variables: fitted values of ihs_dep2
chi2(1)      =    17.42
Prob > chi2  =   0.0000
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Table A8: Dependent Variable Summary Statistics (Before and After the transformation)
VARIABLES N Mean Standard 
Deviation
Variance skewness kurtosis
Vote Share (%) 
Extreme Right 
Parties




90 0.639 0.998 0.996 1.408 3.783
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Rule of Law 0.9473 0.9408 0.5996 1.0000
Regulatory 
Quality
0.8968 0.8823 0.5829 0.9095 1.0000
Voice and 
Accountability
0.8637 0.8437 0.5728 0.8535 0.8212 1.0000
Source: Data from Worldwide Governance Indicators gathered from Quality of Government Institute.
Table A10: Summary statistics of Quality of Government variables
VARIABLES N Mean sd min max
Control for Corruption 90 0.954 0.848 -0.304 2.500
Government Effectiveness 90 1.105 0.627 -0.316 2.345
Political Stability and Absence of Violence 90 0.699 0.425 -0.305 1.514
Rule of Law 90 1.068 0.643 -0.227 2.121
Regulatory Quality 90 1.165 0.455 -0.0723 1.904
Voice and Accountability 90 1.112 0.395 0.296 2.500
Control for Corruption and Rule of Law Row Mean 90 1.011 0.736 -0.262 2.242
QoG 90 1.017 0.522 -0.0465 1.909
Government Selection 90 0.905 0.364 0.233 1.692
Government Capacity 90 1.135 0.525 -0.171 2.067
Source: Data from Worldwide Governance Indicators gathered from Quality of Government Institute. Note: The variables 
Control for Corruption and Rule of Law Row Mean, Quality of Government, Government Selection and Government Capacity 
are calculated by the author based on data from Worldwide Governance Indicators.
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90 + 0.9625 0.9444 0.7599 0.9406
Government 
Effectiveness
90 + 0.9552 0.9336 0.7639 0.9418
Political 
Stability 
90 + 0.7230 0.6154 0.8904 0.9760
Rule of Law 90 + 0.9637 0.9461 0.7592 0.9404
Regulatory 
Quality
90 + 0.9347 0.9039 0.7750 0.9451
Voice and 
Accountability
90 + 0.9094 0.8677 0.7888 0.9492
Test scale 0.7895 0.9575
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Table A12: Summary Statistics of Ideological Positions of Mainstream Right Parties
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
MRPs Positions on Social Issues 90 44.6533 7.830914 27.23757 58.48
MRPs Positions on Cultural Issues 90 19.67 3.051 9.749 24.77
GAL-TAN 90 6.392 1.466 3.125 9.570
Civil Liberties - Law and Order 90 6.603 1.263 4.125 9.430
Social Lifestyle 90 5.935 1.798 1.875 9.710
Religious Principle 90 6.054 1.963 2 9.430
Immigration Policy 90 6.646 1.142 2.611 8.455
Multiculturalism 90 6.774 1.234 3.263 8.778
Ethnic Minorities 90 6.248 1.089 3.875 8.375
Number of id 28 28 28 28 28
Source: Data from Chapel Hill Expert Survey 1999-2014 trend file. Note: The first two variables, Ideology of Mainstream 
Right and Anti-Immigration Mainstream-Right Parties have been calculated by the author based on data from Chapel Hill 
Expert Survey.
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Table A13: Cronbach's Alpha test for MRP1
average
item-test item-rest interitem
Item Obs Sign correlation correlation correlation alpha
GAL-TAN 90 + 0.9086 0.8665 0.4932 0.8538
Civil Liberties - 
Law and Order
90 + 0.7422 0.6404 0.5536 0.8815
Social Lifestyle 90 + 0.8117 0.7324 0.5284 0.8705
Religious 
Principle
90 + 0.7331 0.6285 0.5570 0.8829
Immigration 
Policy
90 + 0.7039 0.5910 0.5676 0.8873
Multiculturalism 90 + 0.8291 0.7560 0.5221 0.8676
Ethnic 
Minorities
90 + 0.7210 0.6129 0.5613 0.8848
Test scale 0.5404 0.8917
Table A14: Cronbach's Alpha test for MRP on immigration, multiculturalism and ethnic minorities
average
item-test item-rest interitem
Item Obs Sign correlation correlation correlation alpha
Immigration 
Policy
90 + 0.8754 0.7164 0.6713 0.8034
Multiculturalism 90 + 0.9011 0.7693 0.6035 0.7527
Ethnic 
Minorities
90 + 0.8621 0.6901 0.7063 0.8279
Test scale 0.6604 0.8537
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Table A15: Baseline Model after the inclusion of interaction terms between variables on Quality of Government and 
Ideological Positions of Mainstream-Right Parties on Social Issues 





QoG1/National Way of 
Life










National Way of Life 0.388**
(0.178)
QoG # National Way of Life -0.379**
(0.189)
Unemployment (%) -0.0153 0.000116 -0.0318
(0.0330) (0.0374) (0.0381)
Real GDP Growth -0.0137 -0.00696 -0.000656
(0.0273) (0.0291) (0.0299)








Constant -18.20 -12.99 0.105
(468.5) (683.4) (368.2)
Sigma_u 0 0 0
(0.0956) (0.104) (0.109)
Sigma_e 0.655*** 0.717*** 0.756***
(0.0798) (0.0880) (0.0935)
Observations 90 90 86
Number of id 28 28 27
Country FE YES YES YES
Log Lik -47.82 -52.37 -55.43
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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with National Way of 
Life Saliency
Three-way-interaction 
with Far-right Issues 
Saliency
QoG 14.57*** 10.60* 10.74*
(5.314) (5.568) (5.534)
Anti-immigration 0.792*** 0.647*** 0.651***
(0.190) (0.208) (0.203)




MRPs incumbent=0 # QoG 0
(0)
MRPs incumbent=1 # QoG -3.664
(4.063)





























QoG # Anti-immigration # 




Far-right Issues (positive) -1.727
(1.060)
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Unemployment (%) 0.0138 -0.0113 -0.0123
(0.0365) (0.0313) (0.0301)
Real GDP Growth -0.00567 -0.0121 -0.0145
(0.0313) (0.0266) (0.0257)








Constant -19.90 -17.56 -17.89
(564.5) (664.2) (562.2)
Sigma_u 0 0 0
(0.0917) (0.0892) (0.0858)
Sigma_e 0.627*** 0.610*** 0.585***
(0.0762) (0.0745) (0.0714)
Observations 90 87 87
Number of id 28 27 27
Country FE YES YES YES
Log Lik -45.65 -45.04 -43.27
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure A4:  Effect of mainstream-right parties positions on immigration, multiculturalism and ethnic minorities on extreme-
right parties support conditional on QoG, by mainstream-right parties incumbency status
Source: Table A16, Model 1
Page 54 of 81
Cambridge University Press
European Political Science Review
For Peer Review
22
Figure A5:  Effect of mainstream-right parties positions on immigration, multiculturalism and ethnic minorities on extreme-
right parties support conditional on QoG, by mainstream-right parties salience on national way of life and multiculturalism
Source: Table A16, Model 2
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Figure A6:  Effect of mainstream-right parties positions on immigration, multiculturalism and ethnic 
minorities on extreme-right parties support conditional on QoG, by mainstream-right parties salience 
on far-right issues
Source: Table A16, Model 3
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Table A17: List of Mainstream Right Parties
Country Name Election Date MRP name Party Abbreviation
Austria 01-Oct-06 Austrian People’s Party ÖVP
Austria 28-Sep-08 Austrian People’s Party ÖVP
Austria 29-Sep-13 Austrian People’s Party ÖVP
Belgium 10-Jun-07 New Flemish Alliance N-VA
Belgium 13-Jun-10 New Flemish Alliance N-VA
Belgium 25-May-14 New Flemish Alliance N-VA
Bulgaria 25-Jun-05 National Movement Simeon the 
Second
NDSV
Bulgaria 05-Jul-09 Citizens for European Development 
of Bulgaria
GERB
Bulgaria 12-May-13 Citizens for European Development 
of Bulgaria
GERB
Bulgaria 05-Oct-14 Citizens for European Development 
of Bulgaria
GERB
Croatia 25-Nov-07 Croatian Democratic Union HDZ
Croatia 04-Dec-11 Croatian Democratic Union HDZ
Croatia 08-Nov-15 Patriotic Coalition
Cyprus 21-May-06 Democratic Coalition DISY
Cyprus 22-May-11 Democratic Coalition DISY
Czech Republic 03-Jun-06 Civic Democratic Party ODS
Czech Republic 29-May-10 Civic Democratic Party ODS
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Czech Republic 26-Oct-13 Civic Democratic Party ODS
Denmark 08-Feb-05 Liberals V
Denmark 13-Nov-07 Liberals V
Denmark 15-Sep-11 Liberals V
Denmark 18-Jun-15 Liberals V
Estonia 04-Mar-07 Estonian Reform Party ER
Estonia 06-Mar-11 Estonian Reform Party ER
Estonia 01-Mar-15 Estonian Reform Party ER
Finland 18-Mar-07 National Coalition KK
Finland 17-Apr-11 National Coalition KK
Finland 19-Apr-15 National Coalition KK
France 10-Jun-07 Union for a Popular Movement UMP
France 10-Jun-12 Union for a Popular Movement UMP
Germany 18-Sep-05 Christian Democratic 
Union/Christian Social Union
CDU/CSU
Germany 27-Sep-09 Christian Democratic 
Union/Christian Social Union
CDU/CSU
Germany 22-Sep-13 Christian Democratic 
Union/Christian Social Union
CDU/CSU
Greece 07-Mar-04 New Democracy ND
Greece 16-Sep-07 New Democracy ND
Greece 04-Oct-09 New Democracy ND
Greece 06-May-12 New Democracy ND
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Greece 17-Jun-12 New Democracy ND
Greece 25-Jan-15 New Democracy ND
Greece 20-Sep-15 New Democracy ND
Hungary 09-Apr-06 Alliance of Federation of Young 
Democrats - Hungarian Civic Union 
- Christian Democratic People's Party
FiDeSz-MPSz-KDNP
Hungary 11-Apr-10 Alliance of Federation of Young 
Democrats - Hungarian Civic Union 
- Christian Democratic People's Party
FiDeSz-MPSz-KDNP
Hungary 06-Apr-14 Alliance of Federation of Young 
Democrats - Hungarian Civic Union 
- Christian Democratic People's Party
FiDeSz-MPSz-KDNP
Ireland 24-May-07 Familiy of the Irish
Ireland 25-Feb-11 Familiy of the Irish
Italy 10-Apr-06 Go Italy FI
Italy 13-Apr-08 People of Freedom PdL
Italy 24-Feb-13 Brothers of Italy - National Centre-
right
FDI-CDN
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Lithuania 12-Oct-08 Homeland Union - Lithuanian 
Christian Democrats
TS-LKD
Lithuania 14-Oct-12 Homeland Union - Lithuanian 
Christian Democrats
TS-LKD
Luxembourg 13-Jun-04 Christian Social People’s Party CSV/PCS
Luxembourg 07-Jun-09 Christian Social People’s Party CSV/PCS
Luxembourg 20-Oct-13 Christian Social People’s Party CSV/PCS
Netherlands 22-Nov-06 Christian Democratic Appeal CDA
Netherlands 09-Jun-10 People’s Party for Freedom and 
Democracy
VVD
Netherlands 12-Sep-12 People’s Party for Freedom and 
Democracy
VVD
Poland 25-Sep-05 Law and Justice PiS
Poland 21-Oct-07 Law and Justice PiS
Poland 09-Oct-11 Law and Justice PiS
Portugal 20-Feb-05 Social Democratic Party PSD
Portugal 27-Sep-09 Social Democratic Party PSD
Portugal 05-Jun-11 Social Democratic Party PSD
Portugal 04-Oct-15 Portugal Ahead PàF
Romania 28-Nov-04 Justice and Truth Alliance ADA
Romania 30-Nov-08 National Liberal Party PNL
Romania 09-Dec-12 Social Liberal Union USL
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Slovakia 17-Jun-06 Slovak Democratic and Christian 
Union - Democartic Party
SDKÚ-DS
Slovakia 12-Jun-10 Slovak Democratic and Christian 
Union - Democartic Party
SDKÚ-DS
Slovakia 10-Mar-12 Ordinary People and Independent 
Personalities
OľaNO
Slovenia 03-Oct-04 Slovenian Democratic Party SDS
Slovenia 21-Sep-08 Slovenian Democratic Party SDS
Slovenia 04-Dec-11 Slovenian Democratic Party SDS
Slovenia 13-Jul-14 Slovenian Democratic Party SDS
Spain 14-Mar-04 People's Party PP
Spain 09-Mar-08 People's Party PP
Spain 20-Nov-11 People's Party PP
Spain 20-Dec-15 People's Party PP
Sweden 17-Sep-06 Moderate Coalition Party MSP
Sweden 19-Sep-10 Moderate Coalition Party MSP
Sweden 14-Sep-14 Moderate Coalition Party MSP
United Kingdom 05-May-05 Conservative Party Conservatives
United Kingdom 06-May-10 Conservative Party Conservatives
United Kingdom 07-May-15 Conservative Party Conservatives
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Unemployment (%) -0.0213 -0.00582
(0.0294) (0.0344)
Real GDP Growth -0.0121 -0.00444
(0.0241) (0.0266)
Asylum Seekers (% of population) 3.138** 2.666
(1.594) (1.752)









Number of id 28 28
Country FE YES YES
Log Lik -41.09 -46.89
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Source: Appendix B, Table B1
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QoG 11.80** 30.73* 6.916*** 8.495*
(4.734) (17.80) (2.231) (4.569)
Anti-
immigration
0.716*** 2.213*** 0.831*** 0.967***






(0.205) (0.785) (0.124) (0.0825)
Unemployment 
(%)
-0.0153 -0.0580 -0.0224 -0.0108
(0.0330) (0.122) (0.0578) (0.0622)
Real GDP 
Growth
-0.0137 -0.0799 -0.0352 -0.0155
(0.0273) (0.105) (0.0606) (0.0481)
Asylum 
Seekers (% of 
population)
2.178 2.980 0.233 -0.208
(1.722) (6.376) (0.387) (0.338)
Electoral Rule 
House = 1, 
Plurality
0.368 1.442 0.187 1.156**
(1,580) (3,355) (0.560) (0.492)
Constant -18.20 -52.23 -11.56*** -13.88***
(468.5) (1,047) (3.617) (4.383)
sigma_u 0 0 -11.56*** -13.88***
(0.0956) (0.354) (3.617) (4.383)
sigma_e 0.655*** 2.359*** -11.56*** -13.88***
(0.0798) (0.275) (3.617) (4.383)
Observations 90 90 90 90
Number of id 28 28 28 28
Country FE YES YES NO YES








Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In models 3 and 4 we used robust 
standard errors. Stata does not allow the use of robust standard errors after tobit models.
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Source: Appendix B, Table B2
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Table B3
Columns (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)





























for RR vote 
share
QoG 11.80** 13.24*** 15.90*** 13.92*** 13.32*** 4.743 5.977 12.95*** 10.23** 3.870 3.619 3.861 12.72***




0.716*** 0.781*** 0.880*** 0.816*** 0.752*** 0.394* 0.389* 0.812*** 0.700*** 0.491*** 0.483*** 0.484*** 0.733***
(0.175) (0.195) (0.192) (0.167) (0.171) (0.209) (0.204) (0.172) (0.189) (0.140) (0.138) (0.141) (0.164)
QoG # Anti-
immigration
-0.625*** -0.689*** -0.803*** -0.466** -0.676*** -0.261 -0.291 -0.708*** -0.566*** -0.287** -0.287** -0.274* -0.653***
(0.205) (0.221) (0.219) (0.187) (0.203) (0.241) (0.231) (0.194) (0.216) (0.146) (0.145) (0.150) (0.195)
Unemployment (%) -0.0153 -0.0138 -0.0108 -0.0520 -0.0103 -0.0612 -0.0535 0.00413 -0.0158 -0.0276 -0.0299 -0.0260 -0.00566
(0.0330) (0.0327) (0.0315) (0.0325) (0.0326) (0.0399) (0.0381) (0.0304) (0.0418) (0.0355) (0.0353) (0.0359) (0.0321)
Real GDP Growth -0.0137 -0.0127 -0.0197 -0.0315 -0.000960 -0.0108 0.00802 -0.0636** -0.0387 -0.0144 -0.0127 -0.0152 -0.0229
(0.0273) (0.0270) (0.0264) (0.0247) (0.0282) (0.0317) (0.0327) (0.0286) (0.0342) (0.0324) (0.0323) (0.0327) (0.0260)
Asylum Seekers (% 
of population)
2.178 2.512 3.240* 2.191 2.357 1.650 1.952 1.382 1.218 0.260 0.167 0.490 1.325
(1.722) (1.765) (1.770) (1.825) (1.714) (1.677) (1.611) (1.535) (1.656) (0.916) (0.909) (1.033) (1.711)
Electoral Rule House 
= 1, Plurality
0.368 0.449 0.415 -0.625 0.355 0.261 0.186 0.447 0.800 0.570 0.487 0.767 -0.387
(1,580) (2,226) (1,919) (2,107) (2,176) (2,234) (2,255) (1,891) (1,846) (0.853) (0.866) (0.938) (1,931)


















Crisis (after 2009) -0.869***
(0.272)
Page 67 of 81
Cambridge University Press


















Constant -18.20 -19.95 -22.76 -17.68 -19.72 -11.33 -12.33 -17.78 -15.81 -8.168*** -7.461*** -8.738** -16.76
(468.5) (587.7) (531.2) (602.0) (332.9) (621.4) (625.1) (560.2) (592.4) (3.126) (2.789) (3.500) (444.7)
Constant 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.353*** 1.348*** 1.391*** 0
(0.0956) (0.0946) (0.0912) (0.0681) (0.0972) (0.0981) (0.0970) (0.0856) (0.0894) (0.298) (0.298) (0.309) (0.0918)
Constant 0.655*** 0.648*** 0.623*** 0.428*** 0.645*** 0.635*** 0.606*** 0.583*** 0.610*** 0.840*** 0.842*** 0.842*** 0.626***
(0.0798) (0.0791) (0.0758) (0.0530) (0.0827) (0.0818) (0.0826) (0.0709) (0.0743) (0.121) (0.121) (0.122) (0.0760)
Observations 90 86 87 81 87 83 80 90 90 90 90 90 90
Number of id 28 27 27 25 27 27 26 28 28 28 28 28 28
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Log Lik -47.82 -47.53 -45.88 -25.06 -44.43 -41.74 -37.66 -42.98 -44.89 -83.51 -83.59 -83.42 -45.56
Time FE YES YES YES YES
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure B3
Source: Appendix B, Table B3
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Source: Appendix B, Table B3
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Table B4
Columns (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
























0.716*** 0.468*** 0.587*** 0.798*** 0.443*** 0.499*** 0.695*** 0.767*** 0.649*** 0.390***
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Rule of Law 4.641
(3.281)

































Political Stability and 




Unemployment (%) -0.0153 -0.0287 -0.00104 -0.00431 -0.0156 -0.0371 -0.0266 0.00944 0.00810 -0.00660
(0.0330) (0.0288) (0.0321) (0.0329) (0.0274) (0.0299) (0.0396) (0.0280) (0.0310) (0.0302)
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Real GDP Growth -0.0137 -0.0137 -0.0169 -0.0142 -0.00588 -0.0447* -0.0117 -0.0171 -0.0251 0.00455
(0.0273) (0.0244) (0.0306) (0.0267) (0.0279) (0.0260) (0.0276) (0.0263) (0.0288) (0.0314)
Asylum Seekers (% of 
population)
2.178 3.199* 1.033 1.717 3.591** 2.123 1.602 1.585 0.972 0.284
(1.722) (1.657) (1.773) (1.739) (1.740) (1.636) (1.778) (1.709) (1.801) (1.779)
Electoral Rule House 
= 1, Plurality
0.368 0.606 0.425 -0.133 0.450 0.677 -0.581 1.174 0.0451 0.396
(1,580) (1,762) (1,707) (2,086) (1,829) (1,884) (1,873) (1,586) (1,068) (1,680)
Constant -18.20 -10.68 -16.36 -21.32 -12.90 -8.671 -17.80 -21.32 -18.41 -10.96
(468.5) (603.5) (658.3) (645.8) (509.0) (625.7) (648.6) (504.2) (393.2) (665.6)
Sigma_u 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(0.0956) (0.0882) (0.103) (0.0974) (0.0898) (0.0890) (0.101) (0.0956) (0.103) (0.102)
Sigma_e 0.655*** 0.602*** 0.710*** 0.668*** 0.610*** 0.610*** 0.692*** 0.654*** 0.710*** 0.702***
(0.0798) (0.0730) (0.0870) (0.0814) (0.0737) (0.0744) (0.0847) (0.0794) (0.0870) (0.0861)
Observations 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
Number of id 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Log Lik -47.82 -44.14 -51.78 -48.62 -44.14 -45.36 -50.34 -47.63 -51.75 -51.56
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure B4
Source: Appendix B, Table  B4
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Table B5
Columns (1) (2) (3)






























Unemployment (%) 0.0241 0.0156 0.0129
(0.0319) (0.0328) (0.0405)
Real GDP Growth -0.0389 -0.0154 0.00512
(0.0297) (0.0343) (0.0326)








Constant 19.23 -15.17 -6.485
(643.8) (638.2) (394.3)
Sigma_u 0 0 0
(0.0959) (0.108) (0.104)
Sigma_e 0.655*** 0.721*** 0.719***
(0.0797) (0.0909) (0.0880)
Observations 90 88 88
Number of id 28 28 27
Country FE YES YES YES
Log Lik -47.66 -49.41 -52.18
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure B5
Source: Appendix B, Table B5
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Unemployment (%) 0.0103 0.00666
(0.0325) (0.0347)
Real GDP Growth -0.0227 0.00104
(0.0378) (0.0400)
Asylum Seekers (% of population) 1.210 -1.523
(3.346) (3.479)









Number of id 28 28
Country FE YES YES
Log Lik -34.52 -35.75
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure B6
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Figure B7
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Years Party Positions ND Fidesz
Left-Right 6.44 6.67
GAL/TAN 6.25 7.00
Civil Liberties/Law and Order 6.88 6.25
Social Lifestyle 5.88 7.00
Religious Principle 7.75 6.80
Immigration Policy 6.13 6.75
Multiculturalism 5.63 6.00




Civil Liberties/Law and Order 8.00 7.56
Social Lifestyle 7.09 7.19
Religious Principle 8.09 8.19
Immigration Policy 7.80 6.46
Multiculturalism 7.36 7.21




Civil Liberties/Law and Order 7.11 8.86
Social Lifestyle 8.11 8.31
Religious Principle 8.44 8.71
Immigration Policy 8.00 7.83
Multiculturalism 8.22 7.85
2014
Ethnic Minorities 8.22 7.43
Source: Data from Chapel Hill Expert Survey 1999-2014 trend-file.
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